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Professor,
Mr. O'Neill's comments on "hate crime" compel us to reject it; however, he did not provide us with a definition. What is your definition of "hate crime?"

By Rob October 16, 2009 04:28 PM

Rob,

Conviction for a hate crime involves the prosecutor proving two elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

First, the prosecutor must prove that there has been a crime commited. This would be what you would consider an "ordinary". For example, that the accused is guilty of assault or murder or vandalism.

Next, the prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was motivated to target the victim because of the victim's race, religion, ethnicity, etc. depending on local laws.

Both elements must be proved for a hate crime conviction.

Contrary to what you sometimes hear, no one goes to jail for being a bigot. It is only when the bigot is motivated to break the law by attacking a victim because of his or her race, etc. that a hate crime is commited.

By Pat Young October 16, 2009 04:53 PM

Sorry Rob, I meant to say "This would be what you would consider an "ordinary crime". For example, that the accused is guilty of assault or murder or vandalism."

By Pat Young October 16, 2009 04:57 PM

Professor,
Do "hate crimes" have a higher penalty than "ordinary crimes?"

By Rob October 18, 2009 09:37 AM

Rob,

In NY they do. They step the crime up one level.

So if the underlying crime would be a class B Misdemeanor, the same crime as a hate crime would be a class A misdemeanor.

By Pat Young October 18, 2009 05:56 PM

Professor,
Do not all intentional crimes (i.e., those not to due to negligence) come from a contemptuous mind? If a person vandalizes another person's property, the criminal does not respect the right of private ownership. This lack of respect is due to the criminal's contempt for a thing that he or she does not own.

By Rob October 19, 2009 10:20 AM

Rob,

I'm not sure which crimes require a "contemptuous mind". There are a variety of mental elements which may be needed per each section of the Penal Code. Perhaps you could point me to the specific section which is on your mind.

By Pat Young October 19, 2009 10:40 AM

Professor,
Let's use § 120.10 (assault in the first degree) as an example:

"A person is guilty of assault in the first degree when:
1. With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he
causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of a
deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or
2. With intent to disfigure another person seriously and permanently,
or to destroy, amputate or disable permanently a member or organ of his
body, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or
3. Under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life,
he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to
another person, and thereby causes serious physical injury to another
person; or
4. In the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempted
commission of a felony or of immediate flight therefrom, he, or another
participant if there be any, causes serious physical injury to a person
other than one of the participants.
Assault in the first degree is a class B felony."

Do paragraphs 2 and 3 show a mind that hates mankind (i.e., contemptuous of an innocent human being's intrinsic worth)?

By Rob October 19, 2009 09:42 PM

The proseneed not demonstrate that the accused "hates mankind" to secure a conviction. In para 2, for example, the prosecutor need only show that the accused inteded to cause serious injury and did in fact cause serious injury. Were "hatred of mankind" a necessary element, then the accused could mount as a defense that while he did intend to cause serious injury, he is a loving humanitarian in all his other relations.

By Pat Young October 20, 2009 07:37 AM

Professor,
My argument is not that the prosecution has to prove "hatred of mankind" but that intentional injury to an innocent human being is de facto "hatred." The defense could argue that serious injury was unintentional since the accused is a "loving humanitarian;" however, this would be quite weak if the prosecution could prove paragraphs 2 or 3. Is "assault in the first degree" sufficient to charge a bigot or a "loving humanitarian" with a crime?

By Rob October 20, 2009 10:38 AM

Correction: "The defense could argue that serious injury was intentional and the accused..."

By Rob October 20, 2009 10:45 AM

Rob, you wrote on Oct. 14 at 9:42pm: "Do paragraphs 2 and 3 show a mind that hates mankind (i.e., contemptuous of an innocent human being's intrinsic worth)?"

That is what I responded to.

You now write:

"My argument is not that the prosecution has to prove "hatred of mankind" but that intentional injury to an innocent human being is de facto "hatred.""

To which I can only reply that "hatred" is not an element of the crime you asked about. The only mental element required in (2) is intent to cause serious harm.

The accused may well hate the person harmed, but the prosecutor does not have the burden of proving hatred, only intention to cause the harm.

P.S.-You seem to have some underlying question you want to ask, but you appear to be needlessly moving in stages. Why don't you just ask the question you want answered?

By Pat Young October 20, 2009 11:53 AM

Professor,
If all intentional crimes come from hateful minds and the penal code is sufficient to punish these crimes, why should there be separate "hate crime" laws?

By Rob October 20, 2009 12:49 PM

Somehow I thought that was the real question, and a good one. While I don't accept that "all intentional crimes come from hateful minds", it does trouble many people that some crimes are punished more severely due to the motive for committing the crime, as is clearly the case in "bias crime" or " hate crime" prosecutions.

I am away from my office right now, but, if I have understood your question correctly, I will try to answer it whn I return later today.

By Pat Young October 20, 2009 01:30 PM

Rob,

Penal (criminal) law represents a judgement by society through our legislators of what actions we want to prohibit. It assigns relative judgements about the dangers of those probitited acts by assigning different levels of punishment.

Some acts may be punished with a fine or a few days in jail. These are acts which, while prohibitted, are considered too insignifcant to warrant strong punishment.

Other acts may be so dangerous to society as to warrant a lifetime in jail or even, in some states, death.

Typically, in assigning levels of penalities, we look to the seriousness of the act and the mental state and intention of the person committing the act. In New York, we rank the seriousness of crimes into lesser crimes (misdemeanors) and more serious crimes (felonies). Within each major group, there are subgroups, with, for example, a Class A Felony being very serious and carrying a potential life sentence, while a Class E Felony is punishable by four years or less.

Now let us look at various forms of homicide to see how New York law treats the same act differently depending on the intent of the accused.

Manslaughter in the First Degree (125.20-2) is a class B felony. A person is guilty of this crime if with the intent to cause the death of a person, he causes the death of that person.

Murder in the Second Degree (125.25-1) is a class A felony in which the accused with the intent to cause the death of a person, causes the death of that person.

The difference between the two, both of which involve the intetional killing of another person is that Manslaughter is committed during an "extreme emotional disturbance". In other words, it is not just the intent and the act that is taken into account in differentiating these two forms of homocide, it is also other elements of the mental state of the accused.

Similarly, society often decides that certain acts pose a broader social threat when carried out against specific targets or for specific purposes.

When criminals target police for death or assault, the law often steps up penalties because preventing the police from doing their jobs would lead to a breakdown in law and order.

Acts committed as elements of a terrorist conspiracy are often treated more harshly by the law because they are threats to social functioning as well.

Gang-related crimes are similarly stepped up because they have much more severe consequences for a community than the individual acts of isolated criminals.

Similarly, hate crimes have serious social consequences. They are typically committed to intimidate a whole group of people, which is why many jurisdictions treat hate crimes somewhat more severely.

By Pat Young October 20, 2009 03:50 PM

Professor,
While we are at an impasse regarding "all intentional crimes come from hateful minds," I understand from your expanded definition of "hate crime" that the essence of the act is "to intimidate a whole group of people." Furthermore, these acts yield serious social consequences (e.g. not promoting a free and open society); therefore, society should punish perpetrators of "hate crimes."
Is this a correct interpretation of your argument?

By Rob October 20, 2009 05:09 PM

I don't think i am making an argument, merely describing the purpose of hate crime laws.

But, no, you would be incorrect in saying that I think a hate crime is merely
an act " "to intimidate a whole group of people." Furthermore, these acts yield serious social consequences (e.g. not promoting a free and open society); therefore, society should punish perpetrators of "hate crimes."".

There can be many acts of intimidation that are not hate crime, or not crimes at all. For example, Bruce smith of the Buffalo Bills used to specialize in intimidating opposing linemen.

By Pat Young October 20, 2009 10:53 PM

Professor,
I'm now confused. From the beginning, we defined "hate crime" as a crime (e.g. murder, assault, or vandalism) committed by the accused whose motivation was "to target the victim because of the victim's race, religion, ethnicity, etc. depending on local laws." We then added "hate crimes have serious social consequences" and "they are typically committed to intimidate a whole group of people, which is why many jurisdictions treat hate crimes somewhat more severely."
We agree that society establishes laws to punish behaviors, such as murder or assault, which are deleterious to it. Furthermore, we agree that behaviors which present a broad social threat against specific groups of people (such as police) or carried for specific purposes (such as terrorism) must also be punished.
Our impasse is not only that all intentional crimes from hateful minds but also that penal law is sufficient to punish perpetrators without hate crime legislation.
Let's examine the first part of my argument. While there are many emotions, there are two basic passions which govern man's action: love and hate. Love is man's affinity for another person or a thing. Hate, being the opposite of love, is man's aversion for another person or a thing. These emotions pull man's mind in opposite directions and, when unchecked by reason, will cause man to act irrationally. For example, love of money and hatred of losing a bet can cause the gambler's bankruptcy. The man who intentionally commits manslaughter under an "extreme emotional disturbance" is incapable of rationally controlling his affinity (e.g. love of his wife) and antipathy (e.g. hatred of her infidelity) for the person. Moreover, the man who intentionally murders an innocent man is incapable of rationally controlling these opposite emotional forces (e.g. the man who intentionally murders his victim for money not only loves money but also hates his victim's wealth). Therefore, these emotions unchecked by reason cause man to commit crimes.
The second part of my argument is that the penal law is sufficient to punish perpetrators without hate crime legislation. When society punishes a man's crime, the punishment acts as a retribution and a deterrent. The punishment harms the accused for his transgression and shows society views this behavior as intolerable. Our penal law already punishes the bigot who murders an innocent man because he murdered an innocent man. Therefore, hate crime legislation is superfluous.
Summarily, what is "hate crime" and why should we support its legislation?

By Rob October 21, 2009 11:08 AM

Rob,

You say we have reached an impasse, but until now you have not made an argument, just asked questions.

I am not certain what your argument is. But let me examine some of what you have said, and perhaps you can clarify any mistakes I've made.

First, hate crime legisaltion is not set up apart from "penal law", it is typically part of the penal law.

Second, it is not superflous to a conviction for an ordinary crime, it is an enhancement of such a conviction.

Third, legislatures throughout the United States, and in many other countries as well, have recognized that bias or hate crimes reflect a particular threat to society and should be treated even more more severely. Do you agree that elected legislators can make that determination, or do you believe that all enhancements, say for killing a police officer, gang violence, or for domestic violence, are improper?

Fourth, your contention that hate crime penalties are not needed because the person could be punished under other laws is problematic in the extreme were the same reasoning applied elsewhere. Let me give you an example.

All Americans jurisdictions make assault illegal. However, all our states treat assaults with the intention of killing the victim as attempted murder, a much more serious crime. So the same act will be treated diffently based on the intention of the accused. Your reasoning, however, would hold that because the accused could already be punished under the assault statute there is no need for an attempted murder statute. Fortunately, legislatures understand the need for gradiated penalties based on a calculus of anticipated harms.

In the case of "hate crimes", you appear to have become fixed on a lay person's understanding of the term. You may want to argue that the term itself is a misnomer, since many crimes may be occasioned by "hate", although I would argue that most are precipitated by "greed", "lust", and "jealousy". So, rather than posting about what hatred is, try to address the specifics of New York or other hate crime statutes as opposed to the term "hate" itself. I say this because it is the rare statute that requires the prosecution to prove that the accused "hated" a racial or religious groups.

By Pat Young October 21, 2009 11:40 AM

Professor,

I stated my position in this discourse.

20 October 2009, 10:38am: "...that intentional injury to an innocent human being is de facto "hatred."

Furthermore, I previously argued that an element of hate is involved in all intentional crimes.

On 16 October 2009, you stated:

"Conviction for a hate crime involves the prosecutor proving two elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

First, the prosecutor must prove that there has been a crime committed. This would be what you would consider an "ordinary". For example, that the accused is guilty of assault or murder or vandalism.

Next, the prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was motivated to target the victim because of the victim's race, religion, ethnicity, etc. depending on local laws.

Both elements must be proved for a hate crime conviction.

Contrary to what you sometimes hear, no one goes to jail for being a bigot. It is only when the bigot is motivated to break the law by attacking a victim because of his or her race, etc. that a hate crime is committed."

The prosecutor, according to your definition, must prove that the crime occurred and "prove beyond a reasonable doubt" that the accused was motivated to target the victim's race, religion, etc. because of the victim's race, religious, etc.

Now you state, "I say this because it is the rare statute that requires the prosecution to prove that the accused 'hated' a racial or religious groups."

These statements appear to contradict each other--please clarify.

Additionally, you've done well creating a straw man. I do not argue "that because the accused could already be punished under the assault statute there is no need for an attempted murder statute" and I do not argue against "graduated penalties based on a calculus of anticipated harms." I do argue that "hate crime" enhancement is unnecessary in our current penal system. My reasoning is that without "hate crime" enhancement the bigot will still be punished.

Lastly, from the beginning, I questioned the notion of "hate crime" and not your character. Now you choose to attack my inquiry with an ad hominem ("you appear to have become fixed on a lay person's understanding of the term"). I wish to keep this discourse civil and not resort to these weak tactics.

By Rob October 21, 2009 02:30 PM

No ad hominim here.

I have not insulted you, just mentioned that many people believe that because a statute is called a "hate crime", that one of the elements that must be proved is that the accused "hated" people of a specific race, religion, etc.

Since you keep bringing up "hatred" as an element of the crime, I thought, I believe correctly, that you had made this common mistake. Rather than point to the instances where you did this, I'll accept that you don't think "hatred" is an element.

As for your claim that I have contradicted myself, which I do not take to be an ad hominim attack on your part, I see no contradiction at all. Perhaps you could be more specific as to what contradiction you see?

But, at the risk of being accused of creating a straw man, you appear to see a contradiction between my statement that for a hate crime conviction "the prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was motivated to target the victim because of the victim's race, religion, ethnicity, etc. depending on local laws" and my statement that "it is the rare statute that requires the prosecution to prove that the accused 'hated' a racial or religious groups".

Perhaps I have been too pedantic here. When i say "it is the rare statute" what I mean is that, as far as I know, such a statute does not exist. This is a rhetorical device.

Hence, when I say in the first statement that hatred is not element that needs to be proven, only a targeting based on race, religion, etc. and when i say in the second statement that such statutes do not require a showing of "hate", I am being entirely consistent..

Finally, I'd like to address this remark of yours:

"Additionally, you've done well creating a straw man. I do not argue "that because the accused could already be punished under the assault statute there is no need for an attempted murder statute" and I do not argue against "graduated penalties based on a calculus of anticipated harms." I do argue that "hate crime" enhancement is unnecessary in our current penal system. My reasoning is that without "hate crime" enhancement the bigot will still be punished."

I have not, in this case, created a straw man, although we are certainly in the right season for one.

First, the purpose of hate crimes law is not to punish bigots, but to punish people who commit crimes in which the victim is targeted for harm because of his/her race religion, etc.

Second, my example, in which a person accused of attempted murder could be said to have already been punished if convicted of assault is directly on point. If you look at my last comment, it addresses why this is an appropriate analogy. You are free to disagree with it, or even argue against it, but is hardly an emply shirt filled with straw.

I normally only answer three questions from commenters, but since you have been so convivial, I am happy to converse a while.

Why don't you answer just a couple of questions for me Rob:

1. Can legislators, within Constitutional limits, create greater penalties for the same actions when they threaten broader societal interests?

2. Should painting a swastika and the words "Jews Get Out" on a synagogue be punished the same as if the perpetrator had painted "Rob loves Mary"?

This is not an exam, but realistic answers to each might help me understand your points a bit better.

By Pat Young October 21, 2009 03:10 PM

Rob?

By Pat October 21, 2009 03:46 PM

Professor,

I'm here. I do appreciate this discourse since it will help me better understand what a "hate crime" is and its necessity. Before I answer your two questions, I want ensure my understanding of your statement:

"Hence, when I say in the first statement that hatred is not element that needs to be proven, only a targeting based on race, religion, etc. and when i say in the second statement that such statutes do not require a showing of "hate", I am being entirely consistent."

Do I understand correctly that the prosecutor only needs to show that the accused targeted the victim's such and such (I prefer not to rewrite "race,..., etc.") on account of the victim being such and such?

Lastly, I provided an answer to question 1 earlier in the discourse:

"Furthermore, we agree that behaviors which present a broad social threat against specific groups of people (such as police) or carried for specific purposes (such as terrorism) must also be punished."

For question 2, my answer is "yes." If a perpetrator vandalizes a synagogue, he or she should be punished regardless of the writing. My reasoning is thus: when the intentional act of vandalism occurs, the perpetrator's irrational mind and passions (which I argued earlier) motivated him or her to commit this crime.

By Rob October 21, 2009 05:09 PM

Rob, I'm a bit unsure of your answer to question #1.

Here it is again:

1. Can legislators, within Constitutional limits, create greater penalties for the same actions when they threaten broader societal interests?

By Pat Young October 22, 2009 08:44 AM

Professor,
Yes.

By Rob October 22, 2009 09:20 AM

Rob,

Let me see if I correctly understand your position.

You believe that legislators, within Constitutional limits,can create greater penalties for the same actions when they threaten broader societal interests, but that such enhanced penalties are not appropriate when the perpetrator is targetting a victim or victims based on race, religion, etc.

Is this a fair statement of your view?

By Pat Young October 22, 2009 09:33 AM

Professor,
No, it's not a fair statement of my view. I will make a slight modification in my next response if you agree to answer my previous question:

"Do I understand correctly that the prosecutor only needs to show that the accused targeted the victim's such and such (I prefer not to rewrite "race,..., etc.") on account of the victim being such and such?"

By Rob October 22, 2009 09:55 AM

Rob,

If it is not a fair statement of your view, why don't you correct it?

By Pat Young October 22, 2009 10:23 AM

As for your question for me, instead of the two of us paraphrasing the elements of a hate crime (What the prosecutor needs to prove), let us look at an actual statute. Here are the relevent sections of New York's Hate Crime Act of 2000

1. A person commits a hate crime when he or she commits a specified offense and either:
(a) intentionally selects the person against whom the offense is
committed or intended to be committed in whole or in substantial part
because of a belief or perception regarding the race, color, national
origin, ancestry, gender, religion, religious practice, age, disability
or sexual orientation of a person, regardless of whether the belief or
perception is correct, or
(b) intentionally commits the act or acts constituting the offense in
whole or in substantial part because of a belief or perception regarding
the race, color, national origin, ancestry, gender, religion, religious
practice, age, disability or sexual orientation of a person, regardless
of whether the belief or perception is correct.
2. Proof of race, color, national origin, ancestry, gender, religion,
religious practice, age, disability or sexual orientation of the defend-
ant, the victim or of both the defendant and the victim does not, by
itself, constitute legally sufficient evidence satisfying the people's
burden under paragraph (a) or (b) of subdivision one of this section.

[Just wanted you to know, I was not ignoring your question, just looking up the statute]

By Pat Young October 22, 2009 10:37 AM

So let us look closely at the New York Statute to see what a prosecutor needs to prove.

1. The prosecutor needs to prove that the defendent committed a "specified offense". The statute, later on in the text, contains an extensive list of "specified offenses", all of which are what I referred to earlier as ordinary crimes. If no ordinary crime on the list of specified offenses was committed, then no hate crime was committed.

2. Next the prosecutor needs to prove that the accused intentionally selected the person against whom the offense is committed or intended or intentionally committed the act "in whole or in substantial part because of a belief or perception regarding the race, color, national
origin, ancestry, gender, religion, religious practice, age, disability or sexual orientation of a person, regardless of whether the belief or
perception is correct".

So the victim must have been selected or the crime committed because the accused believed the victim had one of the characteristics specified.

Often the victim does not, in fact, possess the characteristic that motivated the attack. For example, two brothers were walking arm in arm. men jump out of their car and attack the brothers shouting anti-gay slurs. One of the victims is killed. The victims were not gay, but this case will still be tried as a hate crime because the attackers allegedly perceived the victims to be gay and selected them for attack because of that perception.

By Pat Young October 22, 2009 10:59 AM

Professor,
Thank you for answering my question. Before I modify your statement of my view (it will occur in this response), I want to further examine the New York State "hate crime" statute and a prosecutor's "burden of proof." Suppose that you and I were sitting as jurors on this anti-gay "hate crime" case you gave as an example. It is a fact that the accused, as you mentioned, "jumped out of their car and attacked the brothers shouting anti-gay slurs." Furthermore, it is a fact that the accused "perceived the victims to be gay and selected them for attack because of that perception." The motivation for this "hate crime" is found in the perception of gays held by the accused when the accused shouted "anti-gay slurs." Now we have the act (the attack) and the motivation (a perception of gays demonstrated by "shouting anti-gay slurs"). Consequently, we find the accused guilty of "hate crime" under the New York State statute.
Once again we are jurors on a similar case. This time the accused does not shout anti-gay slurs. The prosecution cannot prove that the accused had a perception of gays (although the accused may have one) during the attack; therefore, this case cannot be tried as a "hate crime."
Suppose that we have the unfortunate luck of being called to jury duty for a third time. Again, this is a case with similar circumstances (i.e. an intentional physical attack against someone). This time, however, the accused shouts pro-gay comments during the attack. Would this be considered a "hate crime" under the New York State statute?
I owe you a modification of your statement concerning my view and I will provide it now. I assume that when you wrote "my view" you meant my argument. You wrote the following:

"You believe that legislators, within Constitutional limits,can create greater penalties for the same actions when they threaten broader societal interests, but that such enhanced penalties are not appropriate when the perpetrator is targeting a victim or victims based on race, religion, etc."

The above is not my argument since it creates a conjunction which I did not intend to imply. It is true that we agree on "legislators, within Constitutional limits,can create greater penalties..."; however, this is separate from my conditional argument showing "hate crime" legislation as superfluous. Here is my argument:

If penal law is sufficient to punish perpetrators without hate crime legislation, then hate crime legislation is superfluous.

Penal law is sufficient to punish perpetrators without hate crime legislation.

Therefore, hate crime legislation is superfluous.

By Rob October 22, 2009 12:57 PM

Correction: "...this is separate from my conditional argument that "hate crime" legislation is superfluous."

By Rob October 22, 2009 02:21 PM

In the hypos you present, in the third case of the so-called pro-gay slogans, a prosecutor may try to demonstrate that the assailants were targeting the person for being heterosexual and if proven, this would be a hate crime under New York statute.

I just want to point out, in your hypo, that merely uttering a slur does not, in itself make a particular crime a hate crime. As the statute says, the victim must have been selected or the crime initiated against the person because the victim was perceived to have a particular characteristic. Utterance of slurs may be evidence that this was the case, but may not always be sufficient.

There are many cases in which slurs were used, in barroom fights for example, where the courts concluded that the crime was not initiated for the reasons enumerated in the hate crime statute.

As for your argument, I would remind you that hate crime legislation is typically part of a state's penal laws and that legislators have found that prior existing penal were not sufficient to deter/penalize those committing hate crimes.

By Pat Young October 22, 2009 02:23 PM

Professor,
I thank you again for this discussion. Can you provide me with an example of when a court found the accused guilty of a "hate crime" without the accused uttering a slur or slogan?

By Rob October 22, 2009 03:48 PM

Correction: "...without the accused uttering a slur, slogan, or other demonstrably bias act (such as painting a swastika on a synagogue)?"

By Rob October 22, 2009 04:01 PM

Rob,

You would be correct in thinking that many of those charged with hate crimes have shouted incriminating things at their victims. However, that is not always the case. For example, in 2003 a house in which an immigrant family was sleeping was burned to the ground by a group of teens in Farmingville on Long Island. The teens did not shout epithets or grafitti the house, they started the fire and drove off.

One of the teens told his father what the group had done and the father went to the police. It was only then that the police learned from the teen that the group had wanted to target "Mexicans" and that they felt an antipathy towards that ethnic group.

Here is a link to a page on LIWins which gives the background to the attack, although it is not in any sense a detailed account.

http://www.longislandwins.com/blog/the_farmingville_crucible_part.php

Since the Farmingville burning case occured five years before Long Island Wins was started, there are limited resources on this site about it.

I have heard of other hate crimes in which it was unclear until after an arrest was made for the "ordinary" crime that a hate crime had been committed.

For example, there is the case of "Gunny" Bush. He was recently arrested in connection with the killing of a little girl and her father allegedly by himself and another member of the Minuteman American Defense group. After he was arrested, witnesses came forward who say that he murdered two other people. One of those he was said to have murdered is a Mexican immigrant killed a decade ago. At the time the immigrant's body was discovered there was no indication that this was a bias related crime. However, witnesses now say that Bush told them he killed the man because he was a Mexican. Bush's membership in the Aryan Nations seems to confirm an animus towards certain groups.

DNA evidence from Bush was found at the scene of the murder.

So here is a case where we do not know if any ethnic slurs were used, but where police are now convinced that Bush selected his victim because of his ethnicity. Bush has not been tried in this case. Here is a bit more on the case:

http://www.longislandwins.com/blog/in_the_news/details_emerge_on_fourth_killi.php

By Pat Young October 22, 2009 04:40 PM

Professor,
I'm still slightly confused on proving "a belief or perception" as the motivation of a "hate crime" and "that hatred is not the element that needs to be proven;" nevertheless, I do not want to become a guest on your blog who overstayed his welcome. Although we disagreed on the necessity of "hate crime," as Nietzsche wrote, we "philosophized with a hammer."

By Rob October 22, 2009 05:05 PM

You have been a congenial guest.

By Pat Young October 22, 2009 05:08 PM

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