July 15, 2008 12:31 PM
This is the second in a twenty part series looking at immigration reform.
Frank Sharry, the former head of the National Immigration Forum, was a leading architect of the Congressional immigration reform. In a recent article on the failure of that effort he said that while the so-called Grand Compromise measure was "deeply flawed", those in the now-divided immigrant rights movement who supported the bill "held our noses in doing so". Ostensively they supported the bill because they hoped to improve it, but Sharry says they also had another motivation: "Truth be told, we were motivated as much by fear as by hope, for we worried that in the aftermath of a failed immigration reform effort, the situation for immigrant workers and families on the ground would become a living hell."
The Migration Policy Institute points out that although the Grand Compromise was "the strongest enforcement bill yet to be considered by the Senate, [yet] the public perceived it primarily as an amnesty measure. Opposition to the amnesty provision brought the bill to a halt in June when a vote to cut off debate and vote on the bill failed."
What went wrong? Sharry offers an answer in this year's most talked about article on immigration.
Frank Sharry, whom I have known for nearly twenty years as a skillful inside operator, begins by admitting his own failure: "A year ago I predicted that an admittedly flawed comprehensive immigration reform bill would clear the U.S. Senate, get improved and approved in the House of Representatives, and be signed into law. I was wrong. In June of 2007 the Senate bill crashed and burned before the House ever had a chance to take it up."
The bill was the result of a Left/Right strategy that hoped to pass the bill with impetus from Liberals and the acquiescence of Conservatives. But everything went wrong from the moment the bill was launched, says Sharry: "The so-called “grand bargain” that had been birthed in a back room by the White House and leading Republicans and Democrats in the Senate turned out to be an orphan. The right wing went nuts and mobilized in opposition to what it called an “amnesty” bill. Many in the progressive community stayed on the sidelines or actually opposed what they saw as a Bush- and business- friendly bill that was not sufficiently pro-worker and pro-immigrant."
While the Washington advocates saw room for improving the bill if it passed the Senate, immigrant rights groups around the country recoiled from its enforcement provisions: "We knew the Senate bill was deeply flawed", Sharry writes, "but we believed the legalization component for the 12 million undocumented immigrants was decent and the family reunification provisions could be fixed before final passage, and we were hopeful that if the bill passed the Senate, the House would make it more worker- and immigrant-friendly on a number of fronts."
Instead, the fight for immigration reform degenerated into one of the great legislative cock-ups of the last ten years, and a near-complete victory for the anti-immigrant side.
Here's Sharry's take on the "specific and big-picture reasons" the bill failed.
The specific reasons are twofold. First, the right-wing revolt against President George Bush and the bill intimidated all but a handful of Republicans into opposition. By way of background, the right-left legislative strategy we adopted relied on Bush, Republicans and business allies to deliver 25 to 30 Republican votes in the Senate to reach the filibuster-proof margin of 60 votes. This seemed doable when the grand bargain was first unveiled. But after the party's conservatives decided to join with the extremist anti-immigrant groups to rise up in protest, only 12 Republicans voted for a bill designed to attract their votes. Second, as a policy solution to the complex challenge of illegal immigration, the grand bargain was viewed not only as too liberal by the right, but as too conservative for the left and too unworkable for the policy experts. This combination meant that the bill, which needed to catch an updraft of support from a public wanting a solution and constituencies wanting a bill, instead met a stiff headwind of resistance.
Sharry then sketches out the big picture reasons for defeat:
We were defeated because:
1. We ended up on the wrong side of the globalization/economic anxiety debate and the legitimate concerns of American workers and taxpayers.
2. We were not prepared to effectively counter the culturally charged and increasingly racialized debate.
3. Our field and media efforts were insufficient to counter the intensity and framing of our opponents.
4. Most importantly, we did not have enough electoral might -- meaning identified voters for whom immigration reform is a defining issue -- to strike fear in the hearts of policy makers who were frightened by a more vigorous opposition.
Next week I'll discuss Frank Sharry's analysis, as well as his prescription for getting immigration reform back on track.
What we need to do is secure some kind of permit for the undocumented to work legally here in the USA. The undocumentd immigrants are here in a temporary basis. They are here to work and earn some money and then return to their country of origen.
The undocumented immigrants do not want a path to citizenship. I do not know whose idea was to imply that undocumnted immigrants will stay for ever here in the USA and eventually become USA citizens. Granted that some of them will stay, bring their families and some will be become USA citizens, so their children.
In Conclusion, let's work to secure a legal status for the undocumented immigrants to work legally. Let's forget that they want to become USA Citizens.
By Cesar A. Malaga July 15, 2008 12:49 PM
I don't agree that we should forget about the path to citizenship completely. An example: my parents, like many people, came to the US with the intention of working for 2 years and then going back. They continued to express a desire to go back "someday" for many years. My parents have now been here for about 40 years and don't seem likely to return. Immigration policy doesn't have to make people become citizens immediately, but it shouldn't force people to remain as eternal temp workers if they decide to marry, have children and stay in the US. We need to have an immigration policy that reflects human realities. Of course it may be legally more feasible to win a temp worker program, but that should be seen as a first step.
By nadia July 15, 2008 09:21 PM